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The Common Law Basis of Automobile Guest
Statutes
Approximately half the states have automobile guest statutes,'
which typically provide that an automobile guest cannot recover
damages against a host driver for injuries caused by the host's ordi-
nary negligence. A host driver is liable only if his conduct involves
"gross negligence," "recklessness," "willful misconduct," intoxica-
tion, or some equivalent.2 The statutes thus provide that the duty
of care a host driver owes to guest passengers is less than the ordi-
nary duty of care owed to paying passengers or strangers (other
drivers, their passengers, pedestrians).
Guest statutes have frequently been challenged as violating the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 The consti-
I A list of all such statutes, including those which have been repealed, may be found in
Comment, The Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap to the Recent
Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L. REv. 99 n.1 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Roadmap Comment]. The statute of Alabama is illustrative:
The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not
be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being
transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the
operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton
misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor
vehicle.
ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1959).
2 See, e.g., NEa. REV. STAT. § 39-6,191 (1974) ("gross negligence" or intoxication).
3 Since their inception the guest statutes have been unpopular with courts and commen-
tators. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 186-87 (4th ed. 1971) and authorities cited
therein. Much of the considerable body of judicial interpretation of the statutes has been
concerned to limit their operation: thus the definition of an automobile "guest" may be given
a narrow construction while the notion of what constitutes "recklessness," for instance, is
broadened. An overview of these constructional problems may be found at 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMEs, LAW OF ToRTs 950-62 (1956). See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 1083 (1971); Annot.,
39 A.L.R.3d 1177 (1971); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 1224 (1971). These annotations discuss the
circumstances which may take a passenger out of the "guest" category. See also Annot., 6
A.L.R.3d 769 (1966); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 832 (1966); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 1479 (1935); Annot.,
86 A.L.R. 1145 (1933); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1198 (1931). These annotations discuss the circum-
stances affording an inference of "aggravated misconduct" on the part of the driver. For a
discussion of the constitutionality of automobile guest statutes, see Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 532
(1975).
Courts in jurisdictions without guest statutes have found reasons to refuse to apply the
statutes in choice-of-law situations. See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 356-57, 222 A.2d 205,
210 (1966); Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
See generally Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1970).
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tutional attack has come in two distinct waves. In the first set of
challenges, arising soon after the first statutes were enacted, acts
with typical4 provisions were uniformly upheld. The leading case of
the series was Silver v. Silver,5 in which the Supreme Court upheld
the Connecticut guest statute,6 the first to be enacted. Silver v.
Silver remains the only Supreme Court decision on the constitution-
ality of guest statutes. The second wave of the constitutional attack
began with the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in
Brown v. Merlo,7 which invalidated that state's guest statute for
failure to meet equal protection standards. As of this date, the
courts of seven states have followed Brown v. Merlo in nullifying
their guest statutes; another ten courts have expressly declined to
do so.8
Legislative repeal has been far less common. Guest statutes have been repealed in Con-
necticut (1937), Vermont (1970), Florida (1972), Washington (1974), Montana (1975) and
Colorado (1975). Recent amendments to the guest statutes of Illinois, Texas, and Virginia
have limited or nullified their effect. See Roadmap Comment, supra note 1, at 99 n.1.
The guest statutes originally enacted by Oregon and Delaware were atypical in provid-
ing that a guest passenger should have no right of action against his host for any degree of
negligence; in other words, no duty of care was imposed on the host driver. Both statutes were
found to violate state constitutional guarantees preserving for citizens a right of action for
personal injuries. Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. 120, 159 A. 649 (1932); Stewart v. Houk, 127
Ore. 589, 271 P. 998 (1928). The statutes were later amended to allow an action alleging
aggravated misconduct on the part of the driver, and, as amended, they were upheld by the
courts. Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330,
40 P.2d 1009 (1935).
5 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
- Ch. 308, §§ 1-2, [1927] Conn. Acts 4404 (repealed 1937).
7 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). For discussion of the case, see
McAdams, Automobile Guest Statutes-A Constitutional Analysis, 41 INs. COUNsEL J. 408
(1974); Note, Guest Statutes: Have Recent Cases Brought Them to the End of the Road? 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 447 (1973); 23 DRK L. REV. 216 (1973). A summary of the case law
subsequent to Brown is provided by Note, Guest Statutes and the Common Law Categories:
An Inseparable Duality? 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 467, 473-80 (1976).
State court decisions following Brown v. Merlo are: Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,
523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Manistee Bank &
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d
238 (1975) (prospective application); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974). In
Primes v. Taylor, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975), the court found that Brown v.
Merlo lacked "persuasive force," but nevertheless found Ohio's guest statute unconstitutional
through similar reasoning.
Cases upholding guest statutes after reconsideration in light of Brown v. Merlo are:
Beaseley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315 So. 2d 570 (1975); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97
(Del. 1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193
Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Duerst v. Limbocker, 269 Ore. 252, 525 P.2d 99 (1974);
Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1975); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810
(1974). The courts of two additional states have taken note of the Brown v. Merlo decision
but have upheld their guest statutes, relying on prior decisions rather than reexamining the
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The equal protection challenge to guest statutes has focused on
whether the classifications arguably created by the statutes are
rationally related"0 to achieving the legislature's legitimate objec-
tives in passing such laws. In Brown and the other recent cases,
courts have generally assumed that guest statutes were enacted to
promote hospitality and to prevent collusive lawsuits and have
tested the constitutionality of guest statute classifications by exam-
ining their relationship to achieving these goals."
But the commonly accepted version of the purposes of guest
statutes 12 is purely speculative. 13 This comment argues that the
"purpose" of guest statutes cannot be discerned without reference
to their common law origins, a source of understanding which has
been overlooked in recent commentary and court decisions. Guest
statutes were based on the common law doctrine of degrees of care
as it had developed over two centuries. This comment traces the
constitutional question. White v. Hughes, 257 Ark. 627, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975); Richardson v.
Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d 536 (1974).
In Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1976), a diversity action, the court of ap-
peals-despite its express approval of the logic of Brown v. Merlo-upheld the Indiana guest
statute, on the grounds that the Supreme Court dismissal of the appeal in Cannon v. Oviatt,
supra, constituted an adjudication on the merits.
See text and notes at notes 69-80 infra.
10 The rational relationship test is one tier of the traditional two-tier approach to equal
protection analysis. Under this test a legislative classification must be rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose to withstand constitutional attack. Legislative classifications which
either affect a "suspect class" (such as race) or affect'a "fundamental interest" (an interest
involved which is either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution) are tested
under the more rigorous "strict scrutiny" standard, requiring the state to show a compelling
government interest to justify the classification. For a recent affirmation of the two-tier
approach, see San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Guest statutes are a form of
economic and social legislation, an area which has traditionally been subjected to minimum
scrutiny under the rational relationship test. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970). No court which has considered the constitutionality of guest statutes has suggested
that the strict scrutiny standard is applicable. But some commentators have interpreted
Brown as representing a third "tier," between strict scrutiny and rational relationship. See,
e.g., Roadmap Comment, supra note 1, at 111-23.
1 Compare Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (no
rational relationship perceived to exist), with Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (rejecting Brown and holding that a rational relationship does exist). For a de-
tailed discussion of equal protection analysis as applied to guest statutes, see Roadmap
Comment, supra note 1.
12 These rationales for the passage of guest statutes have been discussed by several
commentators. See, e.g., Roadmap Comment, supra note 1, at 103-04. Frequently alleged as
motivating factors behind these reasons are the economic conditions of the Depression, the
need to protect a large number of uninsured drivers, particularly from being victimized by
suits by hitchikers, and effective lobbying by insurance companies.
"1 The absence of informative legislative history for guest statutes has been noted by
commentators. See, e.g., Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL
L. RE V. 659 (1974).
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history of that doctrine in order to demonstrate that the basis and
rationale of guest statutes rests in conscious legislative decisions to
adopt the common law rule which distinguished on the grounds of
natural justice between the duties of care owed by a host driver who
is compensated and one who is not. Finally, this comment argues
that once their legal basis is understood, guest statutes should with-
stand constitutional attack.
I. THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF GUEST STATUTES
The general principle underlying guest statutes-that the legal
duty owed by one person to another varies with the circumstances
of their relationship-is a basic theme in the development of tort
law and is especially significant near the boundary between tort and
contract. The law of torts can be viewed as establishing a set of
obligations of persons toward each other-a standard of behavior, a
uniform duty of care which is owed and may be demanded 1"-but
the duties thus generally imposed govern the relations of persons
who meet each other as strangers, without the benefit of a prior
consensual arrangement to order their relations. If the tort law is
seen as an implied, standard-form "social contract" by which each
of us agrees to employ "ordinary care" in our behavior toward
strangers in exchange for the right to demand an equivalent level
of care in return, it must be kept in mind that the terms of that
contract are subject to variation or nullification by private ordering
between the parties.
Persons may choose to fix their respective duties and liabilities
by express contract.' 5 But even in the absence of an express agree-
ment, the duty of care which would obtain between strangers may
be modified by circumstances placing the parties on a different
footing from that of persons between whom there exists no private
arrangement of duties. Some form of agreement, implicit in the acts
of the parties if not expressed in words, removes them from the
"1 When men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual
peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for
instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting
himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts
of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from
guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to
their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation
into account.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 86-87 (Howe ed. 1963).
,S The most common ways of doing so, in the area of tort liability, would be by means of
express warranty, disclaimer, or waiver.
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category of strangers; they become persons who have chosen to
stand vis-a-vis each other in a particular way. Their relations are
governed by a private treaty, implied in fact, which supersedes the
"social contract" under which a uniform duty of care would other-
wise be owed. 6
Automobile guest statutes cover one of the various situations in
tort law where the circumstances of the parties' relationships result
in such contractlike modifications of the "ordinary" duty of care. 7
The purposes of the courts and legislatures in adopting the varying
" The distinction in the law of torts between obligations to "strangers" and to persons
who are not, in a legal sense, "strangers" is not often articulated in these terms, although it
is implicit in a wide variety of tort situations. The circumstances which will remove a party
from the category of "stranger," while not making him a party to a contract, can best be
described as contractlike in nature and effect. While there is a threshold reluctance to admit
the language of contracts to a discussion of tort principles, in the present context it seems
more useful to consider, in place of arbitrary classifications of subject matter, a "generalized
theory of civil obligation." See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974).
A recent discussion of another traditional tort subject, medical malpractice, emphasizes
the distinction between duties owed to strangers and to those with whom one stands in a
consensual arrangement.
The two major sources of obligation in our private law are tort and contract, and the
law of medical malpractice illustrates the importance of understanding their interaction
and of setting the proper boundary line between them. Where the two parties to a
particular suit stand as strangers to each other before the harm has occurred, the tort
solution is the only possible one, there being in the nature of the situation no contractual
alternative. Yet where the parties have entered into a consensual relationship, the prob-
lem assumes in the end a contractual dimension even if the subject matter of the
particular case is the physical harm to the plaintiff.
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 87, 94; cf.
Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 506-07,
519-20 (1976).
17 The varying duties owed at common law by a landowner to trespassers, licensees, and
invitees embody modified standards of care contingent on circumstances rather than express
agreement. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 398-99 (4th ed. 1971); Harper, Laube v. Stevenson:
A Discussion, 25 CONN. B.J. 123, 132 (1951); James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land:
Duties Owed to Licencees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954). The doctrine of assumption
of risk is also readily understandable as a contractlike variation of the standard of care. The
action of the plaintiff (in knowingly assuming a risk) takes the place of a written waiver, and
the law will infer an agreement by the plaintiff to forgo a tort remedy which might otherwise
be available. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 439 (4th ed. 1971). Conversely, a preexisting relation
between the parties-arising from their actions or status-may impose a higher duty of care
than that owed between strangers. A clear example is liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation. The traditional view is that while there is no liability for honest, gratuitous, negligent
misrepresentation between strangers, an action will lie where the parties stand in a relation-
ship giving rise to an extraordinary duty. Such a relationship can be fiduciary, contractual
(express or implied), or some other "special relationship." The cornerstone of the decisions
denying any action for merely negligent misrepresentation is Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337
(1889). Although the modern tendency is to recognize "special relationships" in an increas-
ingly broad range of circumstances, there is still no liability for negligent misrepresentation
where no circumstantial grounds for duty are present. See Hadley Byrne & Co. v. Heller &
Partners, [1964] A.C. 465.
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degrees of care approach in the automobile guest situation can best
be understood by tracing the historical development of that ap-
proach from its early application in the law of bailments.
A. The Common Law of Bailments and the Origin of the Doctrine
of Varying Duties of Care
The common law recognized varying duties of care first in the
context of bailments,'8 and the early cases discussing gratuitous
bailments illuminate the rationale for holding that a gratuitous
undertaking imposes a lower degree of care than an undertaking
that is compensated. Since Lord Holt's opinion in the landmark
case of Coggs v. Bernard,"0 the law of torts has recognized that a
bailee who benefits from a bailment will be held to a higher stan-
dard of care than one who does not. Lord Holt's analysis consists of
a sixfold classification of bailments drawn indirectly from Roman
law.2 ' The various types of bailments are distinguished according to
,1 "Without professing to enter into a minute criticism, it may be said that a bailment
is a delivery of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and upon a contract, express
or implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF BAILMENTS § 2, at 5 (9th ed. 1878) [hereinafter cited as STORY ON BAILMENTS]. Justice
Story's definition of a bailment gives little indication of the range of commercial transactions
which were considered to be governed by the law of bailments in the nineteenth century.
Story's treatise, first published in 1832 and continued through nine editions extending over
fifty years, represents the high-water mark of learning on "bailments." By the end of the
century, much of the traditional subject matter of bailments had been absorbed into the
newly discovered law of contract.
" Gratuitous bailments are of particular interest because they are less likely to have been
the subjects of express contracts between the parties and because the common law was
prepared to invest with legal validity and to discriminate among a variety of gratuitous
transactions. The preoccupation with consideration which characterized the common law of
contracts made it a far less versatile instrument for making such distinctions.
10 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703). The defendant, Bernard, had under-
taken wholly gratuitously to transport hogsheads of brandy belonging to Coggs. Due to Ber-
nard's negligence, one of the casks broke and some of the brandy was lost. The question was
whether Bernard was liable to Coggs for his negligence under the circumstances of the bail-
ment.
21 Lord Holt attempted to disguise somewhat the civil law origins of his analysis of
bailments by repeated citations to Bracton, "which is a full authority, if it be not thought
too old." Id. at 919, 92 Eng. Rep. at 113. The discussion of bailments in Bracton's De Legibus
et Consuetudinis Angliae is for the most part a paraphrase of Justinian's Institutes.
The first, second, and sixth categories of the scheme have particular relevance to the
problem of gratuitous undertakings. The classification scheme is briefly as follows. (The
quotations are from Lord Holt's opinion and may be found at 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 912-19, 92
Eng. Rep. 107, 109-13).
(1) The "bare naked bailment of goods, delivered by one man to another to keep for
the use of the bailor" (Roman depositum). The simple gratuitous bailee "is not answerable,
if they are stole without any fault in him, neither will a common neglect make him charge-
able, but he must be guilty of some gross neglect." The bailee is not required to exert himself
to any more than his accustomed standard of care. "As suppose the bailee is an idle, careless,
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the circumstances of the transaction, with the extent of the bailee's
obligation turning on the nature of the relationship between the
bailor and bailee. The determining factor in each case is the balance
of the benefit conferred in a given situation. The bailee who himself
benefits from a bailment will be held to a higher standard of care
than he who undertakes the safekeeping of his friend's goods with
no benefit to himself whatsoever. The rationale behind these dis-
tinctions is recognizable as a simple kind of distributive justice.
Without Lord Holt's intervention, however, this flexible resolution
of the duty question was hardly an inevitable one.22
The full extent to which Lord Holt's opinion represented a new
approach may be demonstrated by reference to the law of bailments
prior to Coggs v. Bernard. For the century preceding Coggs, the
leading authority on bailments was Southcote's Case2 3 which held
drunken fellow, and comes home drunk, and leaves all his doors open, and by reason thereof
the goods happen to be stolen with his own; yet he shall not be charged, because it is the
bailor's own folly to trust such an idle fellow. So that this sort of bailee is the least responsible
for neglects, and under the least obligation of any one, being bound to no other care of the
bailed goods, than he takes of his own." The emphasis on the bailor's freedom of choice-in
modern paraphrase, his opportunities for cost avoidance-is a central element in the rationale
of modified liability for gratuitous transactions.
(2) "The second sort is, when goods or chattels that are useful, are lent to a friend gratis,
to be used by him. . ." (Roman commodatum). The bailee's duty is "the strictest care and
diligence, to keep the goods, so as to restore them back again to the lender, because the bailee
has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least neglect, he will be
answerable. .. ."
(3) "The third sort is, when goods are left with the bailee to be used by him for hire
." (Roman locatio et conductio).
(4) "The fourth sort is, when goods or chattels are delivered to another as a pawn, to
be a security to him for money borrowed of him by the bailor. . ." (Roman vadium).
(5) "The fifth sort is when goods or chattels are delivered to be carried, or something
is to be done about them for a reward to be paid by the person who delivers them to the bailee,
who is to do the thing about them." A private carrier for hire is held to the highest standard
of diligence; a common carrier is held strictly liable. Holmes argued that the special liability
of common carriers had no Roman antecedent and was purely a common law development.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 143-59 (Howe ed. 1963).
(6) "The sixth sort is when there is a delivery of goods or chattels to somebody, who is
to carry them, or do something about them gratis, without any reward for such his work or
carriage . . ." (Roman mandatum, Anglicized to mandate). The precise degree of diligence
to which the mandatary should be held is unclear, as neither Lord Holt nor any Roman
authority is explicit on the point. Sir William Jones states as the general rule that the
mandatary is "considered as having engaged himself to use a degree of diligence and attention
adequate to the performance of his undertaking." W. JONES, ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS
53-54 (1781) [hereinafter cited as JONES ON BAILMENTS]. Others have argued that the manda-
tary, like the purely gratuitous bailee, is obliged to use only slight care. For a variety of views
on the subject, see STORY ON BAILMENTS, supra note 18, §§ 174-88, at 168-81.
" The statement of facts in Lord Raymond's report shows that the parties in Coggs v.
Bernard argued the case on the absolutist common law grounds of duty of care vel non. See
2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
21 4 Coke 836, 76 Eng. Rep. 1061 (K.B. 1601).
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that a gratuitous bailee was strictly liable for the safe return of the
goods. 4 The fact that the transaction was gratuitous in no way
affected the duty imposed. A gratuitous bailee (like any other
bailee) could limit his liability by express stipulation, but in the
absence of express private ordering, Southcote's Case stood for the
proposition that where a duty was imposed at all, it was a duty of
one strict and inflexible standard of care. In place of this all or
nothing obligation, which had come to be perceived as intolerably
harsh,'25 Coggs substituted a flexible system of differing duties, tak-
ing account of circumstances which seemed to affect the natural
justice of a given situation as between the parties. Henceforth, a
common carrier might be held strictly liable; a paid bailee or one
who had the use of bailed goods might owe a duty of reasonable and
prudent care; a gratuitous bailee might owe a duty of slight care,
that is, only the duty to exercise the same care he devoted to his
own possessions.
This flexible scheme of obligations is in keeping with that tend-
ency of the general tort law which allows the circumstantial rela-
tions of the parties to modify the obligations which would be fixed
between them if they stood towards each other as entire strangers.
The underlying rationale of the common law recognition of varying
degrees of care in the context of gratuitous bailments-insofar as
"rationale" is taken to mean the purpose, the intention, the reason
why-is, precisely, the choice of Coggs v. Bernard over Southcote's
Case as a means of resolving the parallel questions presented. This
choice is no arbitrary formulation. It embodies a conscious and ra-
tional preference for a scheme of civil obligations which tends to be
flexible rather than absolute.
B. The Development of the Doctrine of Varying Duties of Care
To trace the common law ancestry of the automobile guest
2, Southcote had delivered certain goods to Bennet for gratuitous safekeeping, and one
J.S. had stolen them feloniously out of Bennet's possession. The question for the court was
whether Bennet was liable for the goods. There was no allegation that Bennet had been
negligent, and it appears to have been assumed that Bennet had taken the same care of
Southcote's goods as he was accustomed to take of his own. The court gave judgment for the
plaintiff, "because the plaintiff delivered the goods to be safe kept, and the defendant had
took it upon him by the acceptance upon such delivery, and therefore he ought to keep them
at his peril, although in such case he should have nothing for his safe keeping." Id., 76 Eng.
Rep. at 1061-62.
" See Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 909-10, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 107-08 (1703).
Several of the justices in Coggs, moreover, expressed their doubts that Lord Coke's formula-
tion of the law in Southcote's Case had ever been correct, but this view has been challenged.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 142 (Howe ed. 1963).
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statutes it is sufficient to show the continuity of the common law
learning on gratuitous bailments, through its transformation into
the more generalized doctrine of degrees of care, to the point where
that doctrine was adopted by the "minority rule" courts as the
grounds of decision in automobile guest passenger cases.
After the decision in Coggs v. Bernard in 1703, bailments re-
mained a distinct legal subject matter for about 200 years. Three
published works comprise the fundamental texts for the entire pe-
riod: Lord Holt's opinion itself; Sir William Jones's essay; 6 and
Justice Story's treatise.2 Lord Holt's conception that a less than
ordinary duty of care should be imposed upon a gratuitous bailee
was incorporated in Story's treatise 8 and, more importantly, was
put into practice by the courts. In the leading Massachusetts case
of Foster v. Essex Bank,21 for example, a gratuitous bailee was exon-
erated from liability for ordinary negligence, even though the bailee
25 JONES ON BAILMENTS, supra note 21.
2 STORY ON BAILMENTS, supra note 18.
2 Id. 523, at 27.
21 17 Mass. 479 (1821). Captain Israel Foster had left with the Essex Bank $53,000 worth
of gold coin. The transaction was a "special deposit," i.e., a simple deposit of goods for
safekeeping, rather than a "general deposit," which would have authorized the bank to treat
the coins as money which it could loan out or otherwise make use of. No charge was made
for accepting the deposit, and it appears to have been undertaken purely as an accommoda-
tion to Captain Foster, who was a stockholder in the bank. Over a number of years, two bank
employees embezzled the greater part of the bank funds, including nearly all of Captain
Foster's gold. The bank's bookkeeping methods were evidently inadequate. On the other hand
it was unquestioned that the bank had taken as diligent care of Captain Foster's gold as it
had of its own. The loss was discovered after Captain Foster's death, and an assumpsit for
$50,000 had and received was brought by his executors.
It is noteworthy, in tracing the doctrine of degrees of care, that the arguments and the
decision of this case were based primarily on the authorities of Justinian, Bracton, Coggs v.
Bernard, and Sir William Jones. An excerpt from Chief Justice Parker's opinion shows how
much the gratuitous bailment doctrine had retained its original form.
It will not be disputed, that, if [the transaction] amounts only to a naked bailment,
without reward, and without any special undertaking, which, in the civil and common
law is called Depositum, the bailee will be answerable only for gross negligence, which
is considered equivalent to a breach of faith: as every one, who receives the goods of
another in deposit, impliedly stipulates that he will take some degree of care of it. The
degree of care, which is necessary to avoid the imputation of bad faith, is measured by
the carefulness which the depositary uses toward his own property of a similar kind. For
although that may be so slight, as to amount even to carelessness in another; yet the
depositor has no reason to expect a change of character, in favor of his particular interest;
and it is his own folly to trust one, who is not able, or willing, to superintend with
diligence his own concerns.
This principle, although denied by Lord Coke . . . has been received as the law
regulating gratuitous bailment . . . from the luminous opinion of Lord Holt in the
celebrated case of Coggs v. Bernard, down to the profound and brilliant treatise of Sir
William Jones . . ..
17 Mass. at 498-99.
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was a bank and the bailment was a keg of gold doubloons deposited
for safekeeping.
But the impact of Coggs extended far beyond the law of bail-
ments. The most fundamental contribution to the common law
made by Lord Holt's opinion was its delineation of the varying
degrees of care which might be legally owed by one person to an-
other. This concept is most apparent in modem tort law in the
distinction between ordinary and gross negligence, which is a logical
consequence of recognizing varying degrees of care." In analyzing
the duties of bailees in Coggs, Lord Holt distinguished between
slight care (e.g., that owed by the purely gratuitous bailee), ordinary
care (e.g., that owed by the pledgee), and extraordinary care (e.g.,
that owed by the recipient of a gratuitous loan for his benefit)."' The
logical converse of these three degrees of care is three degrees of lack
of care, or negligence, for which liability may be imposed. Thus,
where there is a duty of extraordinary care, there will be liability
even for slight negligence; where there is a duty of ordinary care,
there will be liability for negligence; and where there is a duty of
only slight care, there will be liability only for gross negligence.2 In
its full tripartite form, this scheme was probably derived from
Roman law. 3
The idea of gross negligence became increasingly controversial
during the nineteenth century as some judges grew impatient with
the distinctions it required to be drawn.34 Both the doctrine of de-
lo See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 183-86 (4th ed. 1971).
31 See note 21 supra. Jones and Story, more systematic than Lord Holt, both began their
works on bailments with a precise delineation of the arrangement. JONES ON BAILMENTS, supra
note 21, 5-23; STORY ON BAILMENTS, supra note 18, §§ 11-22, at 14-27.
32 "The use of the term gross negligence is only one way of stating that less care is
required in some cases than in others, as in the case of gratuitous bailees, and it is more
correct and scientific to define the degrees of care than the degrees of negligence." Grill v.
General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P. 600, 614 (1866) (Montague Smith, J.).
1 Some authorities on Roman law believe that the three degrees of negligence (or culpa)
were postclassical. See W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 300-03
(1931). Modem opponents of the doctrine of degrees of care have castigated Jones and Story
for their assumption that the tripartite scheme had full classical authority. Article, The Three
Degrees of Negligence, 8 AM. L. REV. 649 (1874); Green, High Care and Gross Negligence, 23
ILL. L. REV. 4, 12-14 (1928). But the concept of slight, ordinary, and gross negligence
(levissima, levis, and lata culpa) was an accepted doctrine of civil law long before its enuncia-
tion by Sir William Jones; if it was not the classical Roman law, it was what Holt, Jones,
and Story thought that law to be. See, e.g., STORY ON BmALMENTS, supra note 18, § 18, at 21
n.2 (quoting the synopsis by Heineccius). Story's footnote indicates some of what were taken
to be the Roman sources for the generalization.
11 The famous bon mot of Baron Rolfe, that "I said I could see no difference between
negligence and gross negligence-that it was the same thing, with the addition of a vitupera-
tive epithet," Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 115-16, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (Ex. 1843),
came to be quoted in support of the assertion that the attempted distinction was one without
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grees of care and the concept of gross negligence survived their
nineteenth century opponents, however, and the 1873 opinion of
Justice Bradley in New York Central R.R. v. Lockwood" is a ringing
endorsement of the doctrine.
The theory of degrees of care and the corresponding liability for
different degrees of negligence were abstracted from the bailments
context and generalized at least as early as Sir William Jones's
treatise. Jones made explicit what Lord Holt had left to inference:
that the duty of care imposed is proportional to the benefit con-
ferred. 6 By the time the courts considered the first automobile guest
passenger cases, this generalized theory of degrees of care, cut loose
from any attachment to the law of bailments, had been applied to
cases involving guest passengers in horse-drawn vehicles. Moffat v.
meaning. Although he chose to quarrel with the terminology, the context of Baron Rolfe's
observation shows that he fully understood and in large part approved the distinction among
degrees of care which the words "gross negligence" reflect. Wilson v. Brett involved the
gratuitous bailment of a horse. "The distinction I intended to make was, that a gratuitous
bailee is only bound to exercise such skill as he possesses, whereas a hirer or borrower may
reasonably be taken to represent to the party who lets, or from whom he borrows, that he is
a person of competent skill. If a person more skilled knows that to be dangerous which another
not so skilled as he does not, surely that makes a difference in the liability. I said I could see
no difference. . . and I intended to leave it to the jury to say whether the defendant, being,
as appeared by the evidence, a person accustomed to the management of horses, was guilty
of culpable negligence." Id.
The leading American case disparaging the distinction between degrees of negligence is
The Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469 (1853). "The theory that there
are three degrees of negligence, described by the terms slight, ordinary, and gross, has been
introduced into the common law from some of the commentators on the Roman law. It may
be doubted if these terms can be usefully applied in practice. Their meaning is not fixed, or
capable of being so. One degree, thus described, not only may be confounded with another,
but it is quite impracticable exactly to distinguish them." Id. at 474.
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873). In this case the Supreme Court stated:
We have already adverted to the tendency of judicial opinion adverse to the distinction
between gross and ordinary negligence. Strictly speaking, these expressions are indica-
tive rather of the degree of care and diligence which is due from a party and which he
fails to perform, than of the amount of inattention, carelessness, or stupidity which he
exhibits. . . . If the opponents of gross negligence mean more than this, and seek to
abolish the distinction of degrees of care, skill, and diligence required in the performance
of various duties and the fulfillment of various contracts, we think they go too far; since
the requirement of different degrees of care in different situations, is too firmly settled
and fixed in the law to be ignored or changed. The compilers of the French Civil Code
undertook to abolish these distinctions by enacting that "Every act whatever, of man,
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
Art. 1382. Toullier, in his commentary on the code, regards this as a happy thought, and
a return to the law of nature. . . .But such an iron rule is too regardless of the founda-
tion principles of human duty, and must often operate with great severity and injustice.
Id. at 382-83.
"' JONES ON BAILMENTS, supra note 21, at 22-23; cf. STORY ON BAULMENTS, supra note 18,
§ 23, at 27.
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Bateman,37 a case involving a buggy which overturned on a dirt road
in Australia, was appealed all the way to the Privy Council. Accord-
ing to Lord Chelmsford, the threshold question in the case was the
degree of care the driver had owed to his passenger. The court found
the transaction wholly gratuitous and held that the driver therefore
owed a duty of only slight care. Since there was no evidence of gross
negligence, the driver could not be found liable. 38 The word "bailee"
does not appear in the opinion. Lord Chelmsford's rhetorical ques-
tion shows the extent to which the benefit-conferred analysis of
bailments had been generalized to indicate degrees of care in
analogous situations: "Is there, then, any evidence of the Appellant
having been guilty of gross negligence-a term which is sufficiently
descriptive of the degree of negligence which renders a person per-
forming a gratuitous service for another, responsible? ' 39 The con-
cept of degrees of care now constituted the fundamental proposi-
tion; and any mention of bailment, in a nonbailment case, would
serve only as a convenient reference to the origins of the doctrine.
In West v. Poor"0 the Massachusetts court provided a very simi-
lar precedent. A little girl who had hitched a ride on a milk wagon
was injured as she was getting out. Considering the child's status,
the court found that she resembled either a licensee or the benefici-
ary of a gratuitous bailment. In either case the duty of the driver
was held to be one of slight care only." The court's indifference to
whether the situation more closely resembled a license or a bailment
shows that the assessment of the proper degree of care was now its
primary consideration, the references to licenses and bailments
serving more as illustrative analogies than as terms of analysis.
II. AUTOMOBILE GUEST PASSENGER CASES AT COMMON LAW
When cases involving automobiles came before the courts, the
common law developed two different rules for determining the lia-
bility of a driver to a guest passenger. The rule followed by a minor-
37 L.R. 3 P.C. 115 (1869).
31 Id. at 121-22.
1' Id. at 122.
" 196 Mass. 183, 81 N.E. 960 (1907).
" In the former case the degree of care required is that of a licensor and licensee
.. which, as has often been said, requires only that the licensor shall not set traps
for the licensee and shall refrain from reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct tending
to injure him. . . . In the latter case, in order to render the bailee liable, it must appear
that he has been guilty of culpable negligence. . . . If the standard of care required was
that of a licensor or gratuitous bailee, as we think it was, it is entirely plain that there
was no breach of duty on the part of the defendant.
Id. at 185, 81 N.E. at 960 (citations omitted).
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ity of jurisdictions originated in Massaletti v. Fitzroy,4 2 where the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a driver was liable only for
gross negligence toward his guest passenger, analogizing the stan-
dard of care owed by a host driver to that owed by a gratuitous
bailee. Massaletti reaffirmed such cases as Moffat and West and,
through them, the doctrine of varying duties of care which had
arisen with the common law learning on bailments beginning in
Coggs v. Bernard.
The plaintiff in Massaletti was riding as the guest of the defen-
dant in an automobile operated by defendant's chauffeur when the
car hit a post and overturned. It was accepted on appeal that the
evidence at trial had been sufficient to show negligence, but not
gross negligence, on the part of the chauffeur." The Massachusetts
court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant. An exhaustive
opinion by Justice Loring contains several points of particular im-
portance.
The court rejected a line of cases advanced by the plaintiff,
which had compared the driver/passenger relation to that of licen-
sor/licensee, holding a driver liable if by his "active negligence" he
increased a present danger or created a new one during the period
of the "license."44 It is true that in West v. Poor the same court had
suggested the licensor/licensee relation as one possible analogy for
the driver/guest passenger situation, but in West the "active negli-
gence" argument had not been confronted. In Massaletti, the court
avoided the logic by which negligent driving was held to constitute
"increasing the danger" by rejecting the license analogy altogether:
"[W]here a defendant invites a plaintiff to ride gratis .in his car-
2 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
,3 Id. at 489, 118 N.E. at 168.
The "increasing the danger" argument originated with Pigeon v. Lane, 80 Conn. 237,
67 A. 886 (1907) and was more fully developed by Patnode v. Foote, 153 App. Div. 494, 138
N.Y.S. 221 (1912).
A person thus invited to ride stands in the same situation as a bare licensee who enters
upon real property which the licensor is under no obligation to make safe or keep so,
but who is liable only for active negligence. . . .Under the above principles, therefore,
one who invites another to ride is not bound to furnish a sound vehicle or a safe horse.
If he should have knowledge that the vehicle was unfit for transportation or the horse
unsafe to drive, another element would arise . . . .These latter elements, however, are
not involved in the present action, and the duty of the defendant toward the plaintiff
only was to use ordinary care not to increase the danger of her riding with him or to create
any new danger.
153 App. Div. at 495-96, 138 N.Y.S. at 222-23. The analysis presents some logical difficulties.
If the negligent host is not obliged to furnish a sound vehicle or a safe horse, why is he obliged
to furnish a careful driver, i.e., one more prudent than himself? The negligence of the driver




riage, the question is not a question of the measure of liability of a
licensor to a licensee. It is the question of the measure of the liability
assumed in a case of a gratuitous undertaking."4 Thus, using lan-
guage strikingly similar to that of Lord Chelmsford in Moffat v.
Bateman, the court accepted the implication of that opinion that
any gratuitous undertaking, not only bailments, will impose differ-
ent duties of care from one that is compensated.
After recognizing the distinction between gross and ordinary
negligence" 6-the logical converse of slight and ordinary care-the
court set out to support its central contention, that "the measure
of liability of one who undertakes to carry gratis is the same as that
of one who undertakes to keep gratis."47 The argument, in part,
deals with the appropriate level of duty to be imposed by a man-
date, Lord Holt's sixth classification of bailments; 5 in part, it ap-
peals to English precedents. 9 The central point drawn from these
authorities is that the gratuitous nature of an undertaking, by itself,
'1 228 Mass. at 492, 118 N.E. at 170. The court stressed the same point later in the
opinion in distinguishing the cases on duties of property owners as irrelevant.
Whether one invited to come on to the defendant's premises for his (the invitee's)
purposes alone takes them as he finds them or can hold the defendant for negligence in
case the premises are in a dangerous condition, is a question of the obligation assumed
by one inviting another to come upon his land; while the extent of the obligation as-
sumed by inviting one to travel gratis in the invitor's carriage is a question of the liability
of one who enters upon a gratuitous undertaking whether it be a gratuitous undertaking
to keep, carry, or lend.
Id. at 508, 118 N.E. at 176.
46 Id. at 501-02, 118 N.E. at 174.
,7 Id. at 508, 118 N.E. at 176-77.
11 If the actual transportation of a gratuitous passenger is to be likened to one of Lord
Holt's six categories of bailments, it seems most like the sixth, the "mandate" or commission,
which is the bailment to receive something and take it somewhere or do something about it.
The notorious difficulty of deciding the appropriate standard of diligence for this bailee, the
mandatary, has been mentioned earlier. See note 21 supra. There are persuasive logical
reasons and scholarly authority for the view that the mandatary's duty, like that of the simple
gratuitous bailee, is of slight care only. Justice Loring explicates the question and marshals
this side of the argument ably. 228 Mass. at 502-06, 118 N.E. at 174-75. It requires no
antiquarian interest, however, to perceive the basic point that if duties are to be imposed to
the extent that there is benefit conferred, the purely gratuitous mandatary will owe the
minimum degree of care.
,1 It would seem that in England the liability of a gratuitous bailee and the liability
of one who undertakes a gratuitous transportation is the same. And to this one thing
more must be added, namely: However much the English judges have quarreled with
the meaning of the words gross negligence, it is the fact that when pushed to a decision
the judges of England have invariably held that to make out liability in case of a
gratuitous undertaking (no matter what the nature of the gratuitous undertaking was)
gross negligence has to be made out.
228 Mass. at 506, 118 N.E. at 176, citing Giblin v. McMullen, L.R. 2 P.C. 317, 336-37 (1869)
(Chelmsford, L.J.) (the leading nineteenth century English opinion on degrees of care), Mof-
fat v. Bateman, L.R. 3 P.C. 115 (1869), and Coughlin v. Gillison, [1899] 1 Q.B. 145.
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justifies imposing a lower level of duty than that imposed in a com-
pensated transaction."
In conclusion, the court, "[a]pproaching the question apart
from authority," expressed its own view of the equitable and practi-
cal considerations in the case:
Justice requires that the one who undertakes to perform a duty
gratuitously should not be under the same measure of obliga-
tion as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay.
There is an inherent difficulty in stating the difference between
the measure of duty which is assumed in two cases. But justice
requires that to make out liability in cases of a gratuitous un-
dertaking the plaintiff ought to prove a materially greater de-
gree of negligence than he has to prove where the defendant is
to be paid for doing the same thing. It is a distinction which
seventy-five years' practice in this Commonwealth has shown
is not too indefinite a one to be drawn by the judge and acted
upon by the jury.51
This was to become the policy "rationale" of automobile guest stat-
utes.
Massaletti v. Fitzroy was the zenith of common law analysis of
the automobile guest problem. None of the state courts that fol-
lowed it to form the minority rule contributed original theory. Their
concurrence simply shows that the Massaletti rationale, although a
minority view, had the support of a recognizable body of judicial
opinion. Six states in addition to Massachusetts decided on com-
mon law grounds to limit in some respects a driver's liability to his
guest passenger. 52
" The court also pointed out that what conduct may constitute any of the various levels
of care will depend on the subject matter of the transaction. Slight care in the transportation
of a human passenger is more care than slight care about a block of wood. 288 Mass. at 507,
118 N.E. at 176.
41 Id. at 510, 118 N.E. at 177. Justice Story made a similar observation.
It would be very difficult, indeed, to persuade any civilized community that a depositary
should be liable for every loss, and bound to the same vigilant care of the deposit, as a
borrower for his own exclusive benefit; or that a mandatary, who, from mere kindness,
gives his services to his friend, should have the same responsibility fastened on him as
a carrier for hire, who stipulates and receives a suitable and adequate reward for his
services and his vigilance. And it will accordingly be found that, in the most polished
as well as in the least refined of nations, whether ancient or modem, distinctions in
degrees of responsibility have been adopted, in all these classes of cases, with a surprising
uniformity.
STORY ON BAILMENTS, supra note 18, § 10, at 14.
52 The other leading cases representing the minority rule may be divided into two catego-




The majority of jurisdictions rejected the Massaletti rule and
held that the automobile driver owed his guest passenger a duty of
ordinary care-the same duty owed to such strangers as pedestrians
and other drivers. 3 Most courts reaching this result ignored the
niceties of the doctrine of degrees of care. But the more thoughtful
decisions, most notably Avery v. Thompson,54 demonstrated that a
common law court taking account of the degrees of care analysis
could nevertheless find that considerations arising from the sub-
stantive nature of the undertaking outweighed those considerations
(1) The Massaletti line of cases are the following:
Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541, 107 A. 383 (1919), closely resembles an abbreviated
Massaletti. The court traced the origins of the doctrine of degrees of care from Coggs v.
Bernard, noting that the doctrine had been repeatedly approved in Pennsylvania, and con-
cluded that "from the well settled law on the subject of bailments we may ascertain and
define the duty which the gratuitous carrier owes his guest [quoting STORY ON BAILMENTS,
supra note 18, § 23]. . . . It follows, therefore, that when a gratuitous carriage is for the sole
benefit of the guest, the law requires slight diligence and makes the carrier only responsible
for gross neglect." Id. at 546, 107 A. at 385.
The court in Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921), adopted Massaletti
as an authoritative precedent without discussion.
In Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655, 247 P. 1034 (1926), the court recognized "varying
degrees of negligence, or varying degrees of required care" as "a practicable working principle
of the law of this state." Id. at 659-60, 247 P. at 1036 (quoting Massaletti at length and with
approval). The decision was reaffirmed en banc in Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27
(1926), which is the Washington case more frequently cited.
In Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931), the court reaffirmed the validity of
the doctrine of degrees of care. The court quoted extensively from Massaletti, adding that
"[to] hold that a guest who, for his own pleasure, is driving with his host may recover from
him for injuries suffered where there is no culpable negligence, shocks one's sense of justice."
Id. at 39, 160 S.E. at 81.
(2) In contrast, the following minority rule cases were based on a "licensee" analysis:
Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N.J.L. 64, 108 A. 862 (Sup. Ct. 1920), presented facts tending to
show negligence or "increasing the danger." The defendant had driven at a high rate of speed
until his car overturned. In affirming a verdict for the defendant, the court found that "the
legal status of the plaintiffs here exhibited is that of licensees to whom the only legal obliga-
tion imposed is that of refraining from the perpetration of acts wantonly or willfully inju-
rious." Id. at 66, 108 A. at 863.
The court in Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926), adopted the formula-
tion of a duty "not to increase the danger" from Patnode v. Foote, 153 App. Div. 494, 138
N.Y.S. 221 (1912) (see note 44 supra), but took a more restrictive view of the consequences.
The court quoted from Patnode the statement that "one who invites another to ride is not
bound to furnish a sound vehicle or a safe horse," and continued: "Similarly we think that
one who asks another to ride with him in his automobile does not guarantee to the guest a
sound automobile or an accomplished degree of skill in the management thereof. His duty
extends only to refraining from increasing the danger which the guest assumes upon entering
the automobile manned by the driver provided. ... Id. at 120, 210 N.W. at 269.
1 The growth of the majority rule of liability may easily be traced through Annot., 20
A.L.R. 1014 (1922); Annot., 26 A.L.R. 1425 (1923); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1338 (1926); Annot., 47
A.L.R. 327 (1927); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 581 (1927); Annot., 61 A.L.R. 1252 (1929); and Annot.,
65 A.L.R. 952 (1930).
11 117 Me. 120, 103 A. 4 (1918).
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flowing from its gratuitous character." Courts which have ignored
the latter half of this balance of considerations have failed to come
to grips with the full extent of the legal problem. The purpose of this
discussion of the minority and majority rules has been not to decide
the question as a matter of common law, but to demonstrate that
the view adopted in Massaletti v. Fitzroy is rational, logically defen-
sible, and based on two centuries of rational precedent.
III. THE ADOPTION OF THE MINORITY RULE BY STATE LEGISLATURES
Confronted by two conflicting rules of law on the duty of care
owed by drivers to guests, the legislatures of approximately half the
states" chose to replace the majority rule prevailing in their jurisdic-
tions with the minority rule of Massaletti and its progeny. Unlike
legislation drafted a priori, the new enactments carried with them
an established ancestry of judicial interpretation. To this extent the
rationale of the common law decisions which they incorporated may
be imputed to the statutes; and their "purpose" may be identified
with the "purpose" of the judicial decisions-that purpose being,
presumably, to promote one ordering of society over an alternative
because the disposition favored was perceived to be the more just.5
As one contemporary commentator noted:
The Massaletti decision commanded widespread attention and
approval. It was supported by certain fundamental attributes
of fairness and justice and its popularity may be well under-
stood. Hence, it was but reasonable that legislatures seeking to
make their motor vehicle legislation as comprehensive as possi-
Having set forth the problem in terms of degrees of care, the court observed, "[Wle
think that the true rule of liability on the part of a voluntary undertaker should be this, that
he be required to exercise that degree of care and caution which would seem reasonable and
proper from the character of the thing undertaken." Id. at 124, 103 A. at 6. In this view, the
voluntary undertaking carries with it the voluntary assumption of a corresponding obligation
of care.
5' See note 1 supra.
57 The "rationale" of automobile guest statutes is, ultimately, the rationale of Coggs v.
Bernard. This prestatute "majority rule" of liability to guest passengers rests on the same
logic as Southcote's Case. By his assumption of the gratuitous undertaking, the driver was
held to have assumed the duty as well-there being only one allowable level of duty. The
"minority rule," by contrast, operated by analogy to Coggs v. Bernard, seeking to impose only
that level of duty which would be appropriate to the relative status of the parties and the
gratuitous nature of the transaction. "Minority rule" courts preferred this disposition of the
problem, just as the King's Bench in 1703 had preferred its disposition of Coggs v. Bernard




ble, eventually should undertake to reduce the rule to statutory
form. 5
Further evidence that the guest statutes were adopted from the
common law tradition may be found in the decisions upholding the
validity of the new statutes against constitutional challenge. Con-
necticut's statute9 offers a good example, since it was one of the first
to be enacted, was the first to be challenged, and was ultimately
upheld by the Supreme Court in that Court's only decision on the
question."
Prior to the enactment of the statute, the Connecticut courts
had followed the "majority rule" on automobile guest passengers.
The state's leading case on the subject"1 expressly disapproved the
argument of Massaletti and the theory of degrees of care, holding a
driver liable for the exercise of "due care" measured by the standard
of "the reasonably prudent person."62 Reversing this common law
rule, the Connecticut statute denied a cause of action to the injured
guest passenger "unless such accident shall have been intentional
on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness
or his reckless disregard of the rights of others. 63 The rule of
Massaletti was now effectively law in Connecticut.
The statute was challenged in the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors on the ground that it was based on an unreasonable classi-
fication and therefore denied automobile guests the equal protection
of the laws. 4 Examining the central classification imposed by the
statute, the court found it neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. The
court's justification is drawn straight from Massaletti.
The statute imposes upon the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle a different degree of care toward a guest than he is
required at common law to exercise toward a passenger who
pays for his transportation. Such a distinction between the
duty imposed in the case of the gratuitous performance of serv-
ices and the performance of them for hire is to be found running
" Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S. CAL. L. REv. 91, 133 (1933).
' Gh. 308, §§ 1-2, [1927] Conn. Acts 4404 (repealed 1937).
" Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
, Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 A. 518 (1922).
'2 Id. at 91, 118 A. at 519.
.3 Ch. 308, § 1, [1927] Conn. Acts 4404.
" Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928). The facts make Silver a paradigm
case. The plaintiff was the wife of the driver. The accident was caused by the driver's
momentary inadvertence in looking away from the road when his son, in the back seat, called
out, "Oh, Daddy, look at the horses!" The defendant received a directed verdict on the
ground that such conduct did not constitute "heedlessness or reckless disregard."
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through many fields of the law, as for example between the
gratuitous bailee and the bailee for hire, the common carrier
and the private driver, the innkeeper and the ordinary social
host. In some jurisdictions it is held that the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle is liable to a guest only in the case of gross
negligence, in analogy to the rule prevailing in the case of a
gratuitous bailment of goods [citing Massaletti]. There is in-
herent justice in the requirement that one who undertakes to
perform a duty gratuitously should not be under the same mea-
sure of obligation as one who enters upon the same undertaking
for pay, and the reason for a distinction between the measure
of liability in the case of a gratuitous bailment and gratuitous
transporation is not obvious. 5
The decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court.66 There the Massaletti rationale was mentioned briefly as one
of several policy considerations which might have influenced the
legislature.67 In rejecting the constitutional challenges subsequently
brought against the guest statutes of other states, most courts re-
ferred to the two Silver v. Silver decisions as authority, and some
referred expressly to Massaletti as well.66
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTES
I The "second wave" of constitutional challenges to guest stat-
utes, following the lead of Brown v. Merlo, has sought to measure
the statutes by equal' protection standards. Courts have thus at-
tempted to analyze and evaluate the supposed purposes of guest
statutes, to identify the "classifications" imposed by the statutes,
and to examine the relationship between purposes and classifica-
tions. 9 Recent opinions both upholding and invalidating guest stat-
utes have performed these three tasks inadequately.
First, courts have assumed that the purposes of guest statutes
are to promote hospitality and to prevent collusive lawsuits, ignor-
' Id. at 378-79, 143 A. at 243.
'6 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
"In some jurisdictions it has been judicially determined that a lower standard of care
should be exacted where the carriage in any type of vehicle is gratuitous." 280 U.S. at 123,
citing Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
" Cases referring to Massaletti include: Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d
961 (1937); Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); and Perozzi v. Ganiere,
149 Ore. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935). Early cases upholding the constitutionality of guest statutes
on various grounds are collected in Annot., 111 A.L.R. 1011 (1937). Naudzius v. Lahr is the
fullest opinion of the post-Silver cases and the one most frequently cited.
"' See cases cited at note 52 supra.
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ing the rationale suggested by an examination of the legal-historical
background of the statutes: a legislative preference for the flexible
common law doctrine of degrees of care as the more just approach
to ordering obligations between automobile drivers and their pas-
sengers.7 0
This rationale is not merely another form of the "protection of
hospitality" hypothesis. There is admittedly a thematic connection
between the ideal of "protection of hospitality" and the sense of
natural justice that suggests that one who undertakes a gratuitous
action should not bear the same liability as one who is compensated.
But the connection is superficial only. "Protection of hospitality" is
at best a transitory objective of social policy, and it was so treated
in Brown v. Merlo. The court found in "protection of hospitality" a
legislative condemnation of the injured guest's "ingratitude" in
suing his host:71 it then found that such "ingratitude" had been
rendered harmless by the interposition of liability insurance.7 2
Compared to the full breadth of the doctrine of degrees of care,
however, this treatment of "protection of hospitality" is essentially
trivial. The common law doctrine is not concerned with "ingrati-
tude," nor are its objectives served by liability insurance. Rather it
embodies a fundamental theory about the nature of civil obliga-
tions: one which deals with the just imposition of obligations, rather
than (as in theories of loss spreading or cost avoidance) the practical
consequences of their discharge or fulfillment. The question is no
longer "is it necessary?" or "does it work?" but "is it right?"
Given its historical background, the doctrine of degrees of care
can scarcely be "arbitrary"; it seems unlikely that it could be "es-
sentially unreasonable." Indeed, to some extent at least, the doc-
trine still reflects what natural justice would seem to require.73 The
11 In a footnote the Brown v. Merlo opinion does make passing reference to Massaletti
and the theory of degrees of care; but the reference is depreciatory and scarcely constitutes a
serious treatment of the issues raised. 8 Cal. 3d at 858 n.1, 506 P.2d at 214 n.1, 106 Cal. Rptr.
at 390 n.1. Whereas the Massaletti opinion was the culmination of a lengthy common law
development, the footnote cited suggests that the degrees-of-care rationale "appears to have
originated with the 1917 Massaletti decision"; the note further observes that "Massaletti
never obtained a following among sister jurisdictions, but in fact seems to have met near-
universal judicial condemnation." As to Massaletti's "following among sister jurisdictions,"
see note 52 supra. What is more important is that Massaletti met with the approval of the
legislatures in California and elsewhere, and that their enactments met with near-universal
judicial support. Here, as elsewhere, the Brown v. Merlo opinion tends to obscure the distinc-
tion between the legislative and judicial functions.
" 8 Cal. 3d at 867 n.8, 506 P.2d at 221 n.8, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397 n.8.
72 "In plain language, there is simply no notion of 'ingratitude' in suing your host's
insurer." Id. at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
11 The ethical presumption of Massaletti, that "one who undertakes to perform a duty
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guest statutes embody this common law doctrine; and they are no
more susceptible than the doctrine itself to a generalized charge of
irrationality.
Second, some recent opinions have inadequately identified the
relevant classifications imposed by guest statutes. The court in
Brown v. Merlo initiated the confusion by discerning in the Califor-
nia guest statute "three distinct levels of classification or discrimi-
nation." The statute was said to distinguish, first, between guests
and paying passengers in automobiles; second, between automobile
guests and "other social guests and recipients of 'generosity' "; and
third, between "different subclasses of automobile guests, withold-
ing recovery from those guests injured while 'in a vehicle' 'during a
ride' 'upon a public highway,' but permitting recovery by auto
guests injured in other circumstances."7 Only the first "classifica-
tion"-that between guests and paying passengers-is directly im-
posed by a guest statute. The court's second "classification," be-
tween automobile guests and other social guests, rests on the un-
stated argument that distinctions imposed by legislation in a given
area of activity must be correspondingly imposed in every area of
activity found to be analogous.7 1 Precisely this argument against
automobile guest statutes was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Silver v. Silvery.7 The Supreme Court, moreover, has adhered to the
gratuitously should not be under the same measure of obligation as one who enters upon the
same undertaking for pay," cannot be dismissed out of hand. It might of course be held to
be outweighed by competing social needs.
11 8 Cal. 3d at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
I5 d.
78 Noting that the common law distinctions between duties of care owed by a landowner
to his guests and business visitors had recently been abolished in California in Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), the court in Brown v. Merlo
discerned an untenable "classification" in the distinction between automobile guests and the
"other social guests and recipients of 'generosity'" whose causes of action for ordinary negli-
gence it had recently confirmed. 8 Cal. 3d at 869-70, 506 P.2d at 222-23, 106 Cal. Rptr. at
398-99. Actually, the existence of an analogous common law doctrine on duties of landowners
tends to support rather than to undermine the "rationality" of the guest/paying passenger
distinction. A court may legitimately reverse the one rule and not the other, precisely because
the former is judge-made law, while the latter is statute.
71 The court in Brown v. Merlo sought to distinguish Silver v. Silver on the ground that
the Supreme Court had addressed only the distinction between automobile guests and guests
in other conveyances, and not the distinction between paying and guest passengers. 8 Cal.
3d at 863 n.4, 506 P.2d at 217 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.4. On the contrary, the rationality
of the obvious distinction between paying and guest passengers appears to have been con-
ceded by petitioners in Silver v. Silver, who attempted rather to distinguish another classifi-
cation in the statute which might be found invidious. "It is said that the vice in the statute
is not that it distinguishes between passengers who pay and those who do not, but between
gratuitous passengers in automobiles and those in other classes of vehicles." 280 U.S. at 123.
In the preceding paragraph of the opinion the paid/gratuitous distinction had been noticed
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view that the legislature is not faced with such an "all or nothing"
choice in regulating a particular area.78 The final "classification"
identified by the California court, "between different subclasses of
automobile guests," seems almost disingenuous. By this line of ar-
gument the court simply imputed to the statutory scheme the ec-
centricities in its application which were the result of the court's
own prior decisions taking certain cases out of the statute.79
What remains is the analytical core of the guest statute prob-
lem, the "classification" of guests and paying passengers: in other
words, the distinction between gratuitous and paid transportation.
The distinction between activity that is gratuitous and activity that
is compensated is not only "rationally related" to the statutes'
purpose-recognition of degrees of care-it is in a sense identical
with that purpose.
by the Court as one objective of the statute. "In some jurisdictions it has been judicially
determined that a lower standard of care should be exacted where the carriage in any type of
vehicle is gratuitous [citing cases]." Id. Petitioners tried to emphasize alternative "classifi-
cations" before the Supreme Court because the central, paid/gratuitous distinction had been
extensively treated, and squarely upheld, in the decision under review. Silver v. Silver, 108
Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928). See text at note 65 supra.
1' E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1971); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
It Restrictive judicial interpretations which might be read as creating unreasonable clas-
sifications are quite common. See note 3 supra. The California Supreme Court, for instance,
had increasingly narrowed the scope of the guest statute. The court had held the statute
inapplicable where the "ride" was momentarily interrupted to inspect the vehicle's tires;
where the passenger was on the running board of the car rather than inside it; and where the
vehicle was on a private road rather than a public highway. In Brown v. Merlo, the court
found that these distinctions bore no rational relation to the purposes of the statute, but
rather served to render its operation "erratic and fortuitous." 8 Cal. 3d at 879, 506 P.2d at
229, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 405. (In a footnote the court stated, "We reject the contention that this
irrationality has been manufactured by judicial interpretation." 8 Cal. 3d at 880 n.20, 506
P.2d at 230 n.20, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 406 n.20.)
One of the circumstantial distinctions attacked in Brown v. Merlo-between injuries
suffered on "private roads" and on "public highways"-had been read into the law by the
same court only five years before. O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160, 59
Cal. Rptr. 840 (1967). There the court had managed to find that in the section of the Vehicle
Code which contained the guest statute, the word "highway" meant a public highway exclu-
sively; whereas in another section of the same Vehicle Code, dealing with service of process,
the word "highway" included private roads. See Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest
Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 884 (1968). Defendants in O'Donnell v. Mullaney appear to have
raised the equal-protection objection which the court would adopt in Brown v. Merlo:
Defendants' final argument is that the suggested result creates an unconstitutional
distinction between the obligations of one who is an automobile host on a highway and
one in the same status on a private road. That contention is without merit. The legisla-
ture has wide discretion in making a classification, and its exercise in this instance does
not distinguish among persons of like conditions and circumstances; it need not attempt
to correct all supposed abuses at once.
66 Cal. 2d at 999, 429 P.2d at 163, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 843, citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117
(1929).
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Approaching the problem apart from preconceived categories,
one would not tend to analyze the automobile guest statutes in
terms of "classifications" at all. The method betrays a constitu-
tional expediency: since our only available weapon is the equal pro-
tection clause, we shall look for "classifications." But once it is
understood that the statutes' "purpose" is to give effect in this area
to the doctrine of degrees of care, and to impose a higher duty of
care on compensated than on gratuitous undertakings, then it be-
comes merely idle to argue that there is not "rational relationship"
between their preeminent "classification" and their underlying
''purpose." Putting the argument in these terms already tends to
obscure the logical conception behind the notion of "rational rela-
tionship," which is a test to determine impermissible distinctions
in the effect of legislation on different classes of people. A require-
ment that those who register to vote be at least six feet tall estab-
lishes a classification which would presumably be held to lack a
rational relationship to any permissible purpose of the voting laws.
Automobile guest statutes, by contrast, do not distinguish between
classes of people but between courses of action: if someone does such
and such, the legal consequences shall be so and so. A "classifica-
tion" in this sense is effected by every piece of police legislation; but
in the original sense of equal protection, this is no "classification"
at all.
The law of equal protection has merely an incidental, strategic
connection with the subject of automobile guest statutes. Brown v.
Merlo represents an extreme example of judicial interventionism in
the name of equal protection, and one from which the California
Supreme Court has already retreated." A more restrained judicial
The reappraisal of Brown v. Merlo may also be observed in the California Supreme
Court's treatment of the closely-related problem of the automobile "guest-driver" situation.
The California guest statute had been amended in 1961 to provide that a car owner, injured
while riding in his own car as the passenger of his "guest," should have the same restricted
right of action against the driver as the guest passenger. Brown v. Merlo expressly declined
to rule on the constitutionality of this part of the statute. 8 Cal. 3d at 862 n.3, 506 P.2d at
217 n.3, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.3. After Brown v. Merlo the legislature repealed the guest-
passenger aspects of the statute but retained the guest driver aspects. WEST CAL. ANN. VEH.
CODE § 17158 (Supp. 1976). When the guest-driver provision was later considered in Schwalbe
v. Jones, 14 Cal. 3d 1, 534 P.2d 73, 120 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975), rev'd on rehearing, 16 Cal. 3d
514, 546 P.2d 1033, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976), the majority, in an opinion by Justice Tobriner
(the author of the Brown v. Merlo decision) found, not surprisingly, that the guest-driver
provision was also invalid. But while Brown v. Merlo had been unanimous, this decision was
by a four-to-three vote over the strong dissent of Justice Sullivan. Schwalbe v. Jones was
reversed on rehearing by a five-to-two vote, with Justice Sullivan writing the new majority
opinion and Justice Tobriner the dissent. The opinions by Justice Sullivan in Schwalbe v.
Jones comprise the most cogent published criticism of the equal protection excesses of Brown
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attitude toward the remaining guest statutes would still leave them
a suitable object for the attention of legislatures and an interesting
phenomenon in the law of torts. They cannot be evaluated in either
context without an appreciation of their now-forgotten origin and
rationale.
CONCLUSION
This comment has had a dual purpose. As a matter of general
historical interest, it has traced the legal background of automobile
guest statutes, indicating their foundations in the common law doc-
trine of degrees of care. This doctrine, originating in Roman law and
first appearing in the common law in the law of bailments, offers
one approach to a fundamental issue that must be confronted by
any theory of civil obligations: the question of how far, and in what
circumstances, the relations of the parties to a transaction may
modify the duties of care owed by each party to the other. In modern
tort law, with its tendency toward expanding civil liability, the
doctrine of degrees of care has been severely eroded in such settings
as the liability of charitable organizations.8' Although other policy
considerations may be found to outweigh the considerations re-
flected in the doctrine of degrees of care in such situations, it is
important that the notions of justice represented by the doctrine be
at least recognized by the body that does the weighing.
The second, and related, object of this comment has been to
demonstrate the inadequacy of analysis of those courts which have
recently considered the constitutionality of automobile guest stat-
utes under the equal protection clause. The motives of the courts
whose decisions stretch equal protection doctrine to invalidate guest
statutes are not difficult to discern. The view that the statutes have
led to inefficient and undesirable results is widely held and easily
supportable. 2 A modern court might fairly conclude that Avery v.
v. Merlo. In his majority opinion in Schwalbe v. Jones on rehearing, Justice Sullivan cites
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Silver v. Silver in a footnote explaining the California
court's retreat from the broad language of Brown v. Merlo. 16 Cal. 3d at 518 n.2, 546 P.2d at
1035 n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.2. In a later footnote, he quotes from Silver with approval.
16 Cal. 3d at 523 n.12, 546 P.2d at 1039 n.12, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 327 n.12.
8, See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 133, at 992-94 (4th ed. 1974). Courts have
also begun to do away with the distinctions among the degrees of care owed by owners and
occupiers of land to trespassers, licensees, and invitees-requiring the same standard duty
of care in all cases. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d
561 (1968); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 62, at 398-99 (4th ed. 1974). These distinctions,
however, are usually not enacted by statute and may therefore be discarded without the use
of constitutional doctrine. See notes 76 supra & 84 infra.
1' For critical discussions of guest statutes, see, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 186-87
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Thompson 3 is a preferable holding to Massaletti v. Fitzroy, or that
common law principles, of whatever significance, must yield in time
to modern policy considerations. 4 It may be regrettable that the
question of guest passenger liability was ever taken from the courts,
where it might have undergone an evolution more readily responsive
to contemporary needs. But once the legislature has intervened and
the question has been settled by statute, further decisions as to the
balance of policy objectives are no longer within a court's preroga-
tive. To ignore this distinction, and to engage in collateral attack
by means of a less than forthright use of the equal protection clause,
is to seek to avoid the most fundamental restriction on the role of
the judiciary in our jurisprudence.
Andrew Kull
(4th ed. 1971); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1968); White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a
Non-Paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REV. 326 (1934); Note, The Present Status of Automobile
Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1974); Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest
Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 884 (1968); Comment, The Future of the Automobile Guest
Statute, 45 TFmp. L.Q. 432 (1972).
" See text and note at note 54 supra.
" Such was the rationale of McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d
374, 113 NW.2d 14 (1962), reversing the judicial rule in Wisconsin limiting a driver's liability
to his guest passenger. The court considered the legal principle by which liability may be
limited where "certain relationships, founded on consent, exist between an actor and an
injured party," but held that principle to be outweighed by "present-day customs and com-
munity attitude toward the use of automobiles." Id. at 377-78, 113 N.W.2d at 16.
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